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Abstract—Orphan transactions are those whose parental
income-sources are missing at the time that they are processed.
These transactions are not propagated to other nodes until all
of their missing parents are received, and they thus end up
languishing in a local buffer until evicted or their parents are
found. Although there has been little work in the literature on
characterizing the nature and impact of such orphans, it is intu-
itive that they may affect throughput on the Bitcoin network. This
work thus seeks to methodically research such effects through
a measurement campaign of orphan transactions on live Bitcoin
nodes. Our data show that, surprisingly, orphan transactions tend
to have fewer parents on average than non-orphan transactions.
Moreover, the salient features of their missing parents are a lower
fee and larger size than their non-orphan counterparts, resulting
in a lower transaction fee per byte. Finally, we note that the
network overhead incurred by these orphan transactions can
be significant, exceeding 17% when using the default orphan
memory pool size (100 transactions). However, this overhead can
be made negligible, without significant computational or memory
demands, if the pool size is merely increased to 1000 transactions.
Index Terms—bitcoin, orphan transactions, characterization
I. INTRODUCTION
With a market cap of over 135 billion US dollars [1], the
Bitcoin cryptocurrency has come a long way since its intro-
duction as a peer-to-peer, electronic cash system by Satoshi
Nakamoto in 2008 [2]. Nodes within the Bitcoin network
exchange transactions to record purchases and sales using
Bitcoin currency, one unit of which is further subdivided into
100 million satoshis. After such a transaction is created, it is
propagated through the Bitcoin network, whose nodes add it to
their local memory buffer called a mempool. Transactions stay
in the mempool until confirmed by a Bitcoin miner [3] and
added to a block in the common ledger known as a blockchain.
Every day, hundreds of thousands of transactions are created
and confirmed in the Bitcoin network [4], resulting in a total
of over 480 million Bitcoin transactions since the inception of
the network [5].
Before relaying a transaction to its peers, a node in the
Bitcoin network must confirm that the transaction has verified
currency input from its parent transactions. If node does
not have the parent transactions in its mempool or local
blockchain, then the transaction is classified an orphan, and
it is not relayed further until the parents arrive. We seek
to more precisely understand the context under which a
transaction becomes an orphan, including the properties of
parent transactions that produce this behavior.
a) History: Bitcoin transactions have received a fair
amount of attention in the literature. Subset of this work have
focused on elements such as an analysis of the transaction
graphs [6]–[12], security of transactions [13]–[18], studies on
transaction confirmation times [19]–[22], and the like.
Understanding the properties and behavior of orphan trans-
actions, however, is a largely unexplored field. The closest
works have been on utilizing orphan transactions as a side-
channel for topology inference [23], and for denial of service
attacks on the Bitcoin network [24]. However, many of the
performance questions regarding orphan transactions remain:
To what extent orphan transactions are prevalent in the Bitcoin
network? What are the factors that make a transaction orphan?
What is the impact of an orphan transaction on the perfor-
mance of the Bitcoin ecosystem? Does an orphan transaction
incur latency or communication overhead? If so, can one
reduce this overhead? There exists no work, to the best of
our knowledge, that reasonably answers these questions.
b) Contributions: Our first contribution in this paper, is
to characterize orphan transactions in the Bitcoin network and
identify the environment that produces them. We discover that
the intuition that orphan transactions may have larger numbers
of parents than non-orphan parents (presumably resulting in a
greater probability that one of the parents is missing) is mis-
leading. Our data set includes 4.20× 106 unique transactions
received over the measurement period. Of these, 8.71× 104
are orphan transactions. Indeed, orphan transactions generally
have fewer parents than all other transaction received during
our measurements, averaging 1.18 parents (orphans) versus
2.20 (non-orphans). As a result, we conclude that the number
of parents is not a suitable distinguisher between orphan and
non-orphan transactions.
We then consider other metrics (i.e., transaction fee, transac-
tion size, and transaction fee per byte) to discern the distinction
between these two types of transactions. Our analysis shows
that missing parents of orphan transactions have smaller fees
and larger size than their non-orphan counterparts. More
precisely, a missing parent of an orphan transaction has
an average transaction fee of 5.56× 103 satoshis, and an
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average transaction size of 5.29× 102 bytes. By comparison,
non-orphan transactions have an average transaction fee of
9.91× 103 satoshis and transaction size of 4.80× 102 bytes.
Finally, we find that, on an individual level, missing parents
of orphan transactions pay a fee of 6.25 satoshis per byte
versus 21.73 satoshis per byte for non-orphan transactions.
As a result, transactions with a smaller fee per byte are more
likely to go missing and render their descendent transactions
orphans.
Our second contribution is to study the impact of network
and performance overhead caused by orphan transactions. We
thus collect data from live nodes in the Bitcoin network with
various orphan pool sizes (including the default of 100). Our
measurements show that orphan transactions incur a significant
network overhead (as a function of the number of bytes
received by a node) when the orphan pool size is smaller.
In effect, the pool fills up quickly and transactions in the
orphan pool are rapidly evicted to make room for new orphan
transactions. As a result, an orphan transaction may be added
to the orphan pool multiple times as it is announced by
several peers. We show that by increasing the orphan pool
size to a slightly larger value, this network overhead can be
dramatically reduced. In particular, we show that increasing
the orphan pool size to 1000 transactions does not have a
distinguishable effect on the performance of the node (in terms
of computation and memory), while the network overhead
becomes negligible.
c) Roadmap: The rest of paper is organized as follows:
In Section II, we present preliminary background and related
work. In Section III, we characterize orphan transactions by
studying the properties of their parents. We show the impact
of orphan transactions with varying orphan pool sizes in
Section IV. Section V concludes the paper and discusses
potential areas for future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide relevant background material on
the orphan transactions followed by a discussion of related
work.
A. Orphan transactions
A Bitcoin node may receive a transaction that spends
income from one or more parent transactions that it has not
yet seen. In other words, the parents are neither included
in any of the previous blocks of the Bitcoin blockchain nor
exist in the node’s mempool. The node cannot accept the
newly received transaction to its mempool until it can verify
that the transaction spends valid Bitcoin, and it thus requests
the missing parents from the peer that originally sent the
orphan transaction. In the meanwhile, the transaction is thus
classified as an orphan transaction and added to an orphan
pool that is maintained by the mapOrphanTransactions
data structure in the Bitcoin core software.
Once the orphan transaction is added to the orphan pool,
there are six cases that can cause its removal (corresponding to
lines 76, 2331, 2326−2330, 1609−1620, 876−906, 800−806,
40, 784−794, 627, 757−771, 1624−1632, and 1608 in the
core implementation of netprocessing.cpp [25]):
1. Parent transactions received. The node receives a parent
it requested from its peer. It then processes any orphan
transactions that depend on the newly received trans-
action. All transactions that are no longer orphan are
removed from the orphan pool and added to the mempool.
2. Parent transactions in block. The node receives a
new block which contains the missing parents needed
to verify the orphan transaction. The node iterates over
the transactions in the block and removes any orphan
transactions from the orphan pool that depend on the
former and add it to the mempool.
3. Orphan pool full. By default, the size of the orphan
pool is capped to a maximum of 100 orphan transac-
tions. When the orphan pool is full, an orphan transac-
tion is chosen at random and removed from the pool,
and this transaction is not added to the mempool. The
maximum size of the orphan pool can be modified at
startup by using the -maxorphantx argument when
running bitcoind or bitcoin-qt, or set in the
bitcoin.conf configuration file [26].
4. Timeout. By default, an orphan transaction expires and is
removed after 20 contiguous minutes in the orphan pool.
5. Invalid orphan transaction. The node deems that an
orphan transaction is invalid when the missing parents
of the orphan transaction have been received, but the
orphan transaction itself may be non-standard or not
have sufficient fee. Thus, this orphan transaction is not
accepted to the mempool. Furthermore, not only the
orphan transaction is removed from the orphan pool, but
also the peer that originally sent the orphan transaction is
punished, i.e., no further transactions are accepted to the
mempool from the peer in the current round.
6. Peer disconnected. When a peer disconnects from a
node, all orphan transactions sent by this peer are re-
moved from the orphan pool in the finalization step. This
is likely because the node no longer expects to receive the
parents it requested from the peer. The orphan transaction
is not added to the mempool.
A transaction may get stuck [27] in mempools of nodes due
to low transaction fees. That is, the transaction is not included
in blocks and faces delays in confirmation. Bitcoin does allow
the transactions to be modified to increase the fee [28], and
the originator of the transaction may add a new input, i.e., a
new parent, as a spending source for the increased fee. The
transaction may become orphaned if the new input is missing
from the receiving node’s mempool or local blockchain, and
this transaction is then added to the orphan pool. We do not
classify such orphan transactions separately because they do
make it to the orphan pool.
B. Related work
To the best of our knowledge, there is very little work in
the Bitcoin research literature regarding orphan transactions.
Nevertheless, the few works that do consider them highlight
the potential importance of the area, and the need for further
work.
Miller and Jansen [24] take advantage of the fact that in the
older version of Bitcoin (i.e., v0.9.2), the protocol did not keep
track of the peer that sent an orphan transaction. They propose
that an adversary can leverage this vulnerability to mount a
denial of service attack by sending a large number of orphan
transactions to the victim node. The latter would be stuck
verifying the transaction signatures of orphan transactions for
a long time. However, this threat model is outdated since, in
the current version, the Bitcoin protocol does keep track of
the sender of an orphan transaction. The work also does not
present a characterization of the orphan transactions.
Delgado-Segura et. al. [23] present TxProbe, a technique
that makes use of orphan transactions to deduce the topology
of the Bitcoin network. In this approach, an adversary creates
a pair of double-spending transactions, and propagates each
to a different node. The nodes try to propagate the double-
spending orphan transaction to one another, if there exists
an edge between the two. However, each of the receiving
node rejects the incoming transaction as an invalid double-
spending transaction. The adversary then sends a transaction
that spends from one of the double-spending transactions
to the node that received the corresponding double-spending
transaction. This latter node will propagate the new transaction
to the second node, if there exists an edge between the two.
However, the second node will add the new transaction to
its orphan pool, since it already rejected its parent earlier.
The adversary can then probe the second node for the orphan
transaction to establish a side-channel: if the node responds
with the orphan transaction, the adversary deduces that there
exists an edge between the two nodes that received the pair
of double-spending transactions. The authors then extend this
basic approach to a larger Bitcoin graph. Though this work
presents an interesting side-channel in the Bitcoin network, it
also does not characterize orphan transactions.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF ORPHAN TRANSACTIONS
We next detail our approaches toward characterizing the
orphan transactions in the Bitcoin network. We bergin with
a presentation of our set up for data collection. Since a
transaction becomes orphan due to the absence of one or more
parents, we next focus on determining the characteristics of
these missing parents. In particular, we compare the number
of parents of orphan transactions with number of parents
of all non-orphan transactions. Thereafter, we consider the
differences between the transaction fee, transaction size, and
transaction fee per byte of the missing parents of orphan
transactions versus all other transactions.
A. Measurement setup
We run two live full nodes N1 and N2 as part of the Bitcoin
network, with the aim of collecting data for characterizing
orphan transactions. Both nodes execute Bitcoin Core v0.18
on the Linux Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS distribution, running on Dell
Inspiron 3670 desktops, each equipped with an 8th Generation
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Fig. 1: Empirical complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion (CCDF) of (i) the number of parents of orphan transac-
tions and (ii) number of parents of non-orphan transactions.
In general, orphan transactions have fewer parents.
Intel® Core i5−8400 processor (9 MB cache, up to 4.0 GHz),
1 TB HDD and 12 GB RAM. The nodes are connected to the
Bitcoin network at all times with the default orphan pool size
of 100. We collect relevant data, such as arrival of transactions,
addition of transactions to the orphan pool, and the like, with
the help of a log-to-file system [29], for roughly 2 weeks
over two rounds (November 18, 2019 11:00 AM to November
25, 2019 10:59 AM, and November 18, 2019 11:00 AM to
December 02, 2019 10:59 AM).
B. Number of parents
Our first conjecture is that a transaction with a large number
of parents may be more likely to miss one or more parents
than a transaction with, say, only a couple of parents. To this
effect, we compare the number of parents of orphan transaction
with the number of parents of all other, received non-orphan
transactions.
During the measurement period, the nodes receive an ag-
gregate of 4.20× 106 unique transactions with 9.23× 106
parents. Of these, 8.71× 104 are orphan transactions with
1.03× 105 parents. These orphan transactions have an aggre-
gate of 8.71× 104 parents missing across the nodes. These
nodes miss, on average, 1.23 parents per orphan transaction
with a standard deviation of 4.68 parents. While only just
above 2% of the received transactions become orphan, the
total number is still significant.
Fig. 1 shows the complementary cumulative distribution
functions (CCDF) of the number of parents of orphan transac-
tions, and the CCDF of the number of parents of non-orphan
transactions. We observe that our conjecture is flipped - the
orphan transactions have a smaller number of parents. Indeed,
only about 4% of orphan transactions have more than one
parents, whereas roughly 25% of non-orphan transactions have
more than one parent.
The most parents of an orphan transaction is 1.03× 103,
whereas this number is 1.10× 103 for non-orphan transac-
tions. On average, an orphan transaction has 1.18 parents with
a standard deviation of 4.78 transactions. On the other hand,
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Fig. 2: Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of transaction
fee of missing parents of orphan transactions, and transaction
fee of all other transactions.
a non-orphan transaction has, on average, 2.20 parents with a
standard deviation of 11.84 transactions.
Surprisingly, orphan transactions do not necessarily have
more parents than non-orphan transactions, and we are left to
rely on other statistics, presented in the next few sections, to
characterize the orphan transactions.
C. Transaction fee of missing parents
For each incoming transaction that is orphaned, we log
the missing parent(s) that results in the transaction becoming
orphan. We analyze and compare the transaction fees of these
missing parents with all other transactions received by our
nodes that are not a missing parent of an orphan transaction.
Fig. 2 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
of transaction fees (in satoshis) of missing parents, and the
CDF of transaction fees (in satoshis) of all other transactions
received by the nodes. The figure shows that a majority of the
missing parents have a lower transaction fee compared to all
other transactions received. Indeed, 50% of missing parents
have a transaction fee smaller than 210 satoshis. On the other
hand, fewer than 6% of all other transactions have a transaction
fee of smaller than 210 satoshis.
In fact, the average transaction fee of a missing parent is
5.56× 103 satoshis with a standard deviation of 7.17× 104
satoshis. In comparison, the average transaction fee of all other
transactions is 9.91× 103 satoshis with a standard deviation
of 5.53× 104 satoshis. Interestingly, 18 of the missing parents
have no transaction fee at all (i.e., 0 satoshis), whereas all other
transactions received have a non-zero transaction fee.
Therefore, a transaction is likely to become an orphan, if
its missing parent has a transaction fee lower than that of
other transactions. As a future work, it would be interesting
to deduce if there exists a threshold for the transaction fee
below which all transactions become missing, i.e., they are not
relayed by the network.
D. Transaction size of missing parents
We next compare the sizes of missing parents of orphan
transactions with the sizes of all other transactions. Do the
missing parents of orphan transactions have a larger size than
an average transaction?
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Fig. 3: CCDFs of transaction size of missing parents of orphan
transactions, and transaction size of all other transactions.
Fig. 3 shows the CCDF of the size of missing parents of
orphan transactions (in bytes) and the CCDF of the size of
all other transactions. The figure shows that missing parents
usually have a larger size than all other transactions. Roughly
90% of the missing parents have a size larger than 250 bytes,
whereas only about 45% of all other transactions have a size
larger than 250 bytes.
Missing parents of orphan transactions have a size be-
tween 1.88× 102 and 2.40× 105 bytes. By comparison, all
other transactions have a size in the range of 8.50× 101
to 2.24× 105 bytes. In fact, on average, missing parents
have a size of 5.29× 102 bytes with a standard deviation of
4.02× 103 bytes. On the other hand, all other transactions
have, on average, a size of 4.80× 102 bytes with a standard
deviation of 2.12× 103 bytes.
The statistics in this section show that the missing parents
of orphan transaction have, on average, a larger transaction
size than all other transactions. As in the previous section,
we leave to future work the question whether there exists a
size threshold above which transactions stop being propaged
through the network.
E. Relation between transaction fee and size of missing par-
ents
We showed in subsection III-C and subsection III-D that, in
aggregate, missing parents tend to have a lower fee and a larger
size whenthan the average received transactions=. However, it
would be interesting to see if there exists a relation between
the fee and size of each individual transaction.
To this end, Fig. 4 shows the CDF of transaction fee per byte
(in satoshis) of missing parents and the CDF of transaction
fee per byte of all transactions received. The figure shows
that the missing parents generally have a lower transaction fee
per byte when compared to all received transactions. Indeed,
80% of missing parents have a transaction fee per byte of
5.97 satoshis or less, whereas roughly 78% of all received
transactions have a transaction fee per byte higher than 5.97
satoshis. On average, missing parents have a transaction fee
per byte of 6.25 satoshis with a standard deviation of 21.52
satoshis. On the other hand, all received transactions have
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Fig. 4: CDFs of transaction fee per byte of missing parents of
orphan transactions, and transaction fee per byte of all other
transactions.
a transaction fee per byte of 21.73 satoshis with a standard
deviation of 47.13 satoshis.
Our data thus show that individual missing parents have a
low transaction fee per byte. This could be because transac-
tions with lower fees may not get properly propagated through
the Bitcoin network [30], possibly because of configurable
mempool size [31]. Note that nodes may choose not to accept
transactions with a low transaction fee per byte to their
mempool, and thereby not propagate them further.
IV. COMPARISON OF ORPHAN TRANSACTION BEHAVIOR
WITH DIFFERENT ORPHAN POOL SIZES
We next characterize the network and performance overhead
incurred by orphan transactions, looking at both the default
orphan pool size of 100 transactions, and various alternative
pool sizes. We begin with a presentation of our extended mea-
surement setup, followed by an investigation of the network
overhead under additions and removals of orphan transactions
fir different orphan pool sizes. Finally, we discuss performance
overhead that a larger orphan pool size may present.
A. Measurement setup
We extend our measurement setup from subsection III-A
to six live full nodes, running with identical hardware and
software specifications as before. We run two rounds of exper-
iments. In the first round, which runs from November 18, 2019
11:00 AM to November 25, 2019 10:59 AM, two nodes are
configured with a default orphan pool size of 100 transactions
(nodes N1 and N2), two nodes with an orphan pool size of 20
transactions (nodes N3 and N4), and the remaining two nodes
with an orphan pool size of 50 transactions (nodes N5 and
N6). In the second round, which runs from November 25, 2019
11:00 AM to December 02, 2019 10:59 AM, two nodes are
configured with a default orphan pool size of 100 transactions
(nodes N1 and N2), two nodes with an orphan pool size of
500 transactions (nodes N3 and N4), and the remaining two
nodes with an orphan pool size of 1000 transactions (nodes
N5 and N6).
Since our nodes are co-located, we want to verify that the
nodes connect independently to outside peers in the network,
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Fig. 5: Similarity matrix depicting average number of common
peers across nodes during the first round of measurement
period.
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Fig. 6: Similarity matrix depicting average number of common
peers across nodes during the second round of measurement
period.
and that our co-location does not impose a bias in the mea-
surements. We achieve this by recording a node’s connected
peers over time, in one second intervals. We then check for
common peers amongst the nodes throughout the measurement
period, i.e., both the first and the second rounds.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the common peers amongst nodes
during the measurement period (i.e., the first and second
rounds of measurement respectively) as similarity matrices.
A similarity score of 1.0 between two nodes indicates that
both nodes have exactly the same peers; a similarity score of
0.0 indicates that the corresponding nodes have no common
peers. The matrices in the figures qualitatively suggest that the
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Fig. 7: Fraction of orphan transactions that are removed from the orphan pool due to each of the six causes across all nodes.
six nodes have a very low number of peers in common, and
therefore, do not present bias towards measurements.
In fact, the maximum number of peers that all six nodes
have in common during the first round of measurements is
11 peers out of a maximum of 124 peers. On average, at
any second during the measurement period, all six nodes
have 8.30 peers in common with a standard deviation of 1.04
peers. Similarly, during the second round of measurements, the
maximum number of peers that all six nodes have in common
is 11 peers out of a maximum of 124 peers. On average,
at any second during the measurement period, all six nodes
have 8.51 peers in common with a standard deviation of 0.92
peers. These statistics confirm that nodes largely connect to,
and interact with peers independently.
B. Removal of orphan transactions from orphan pool
As specified in subsection II-A, there are six different cases
in which a transaction is removed from the orphan pool. In
this section, we analyze the fraction of orphan transactions
that are removed from the orphan pool in each case.
Specifically, Fig. 7 shows the fraction of transactions re-
moved from the orphan transaction falling within each of the
six cases across the nodes with varying orphan pool sizes.
One trend is apparent: the major cases of transaction re-
moval from the orphan pool are when the pool is full and
when a transaction overstays its maximum allowed time in the
pool. The figure clearly shows that as the size of the orphan
pool increases, the major case of eviction of transactions from
the orphan pool changes from the pool being full to the
transactions timing out. That is, as the size of the orphan pool
increases, more transactions are removed from the orphan pool
due to timeout rather than a full orphan pool. In fact, one
of the nodes configured with an orphan pool of size 1000
(i.e., node N6) has no transactions evicted from the orphan
pool, indicating that the pool never becomes full.
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Fig. 8: Number of unique and total number of orphan trans-
actions received across nodes with varying orphan pool sizes.
The remaining four cases contribute very little to the trans-
action being removed from the orphan pool. Of these, the
major case that of transaction eviction from the orphan pool,
across nodes, is that the node receives the missing parent it had
requested from its peers. Fig. 7 shows that as the size of the
orphan pool increases, the fraction of orphan transactions that
receive their respective missing parents gradually increases.
C. Addition of orphan transactions to orphan pool
In the previous section, we showed that for smaller orphan
pools, most transaction removals occur when the pool becomes
full. However, this is not the case with orphan pools of larger
sizes. Once an orphan transaction is removed from the orphan
pool without being added to the mempool (cf. subsection II-A),
it may be added back to the orphan pool. This happens when,
after its removal from the orphan pool, a peer announces the
same transaction while its parents are still missing from the
mempool or the blockchain. In this section, we specifically
look at the number of times a transaction may be added to the
orphan pool with varying orphan pool sizes.
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Fig. 9: Network overhead incurred by nodes with varying
orphan pool sizes across nodes.
To this end, the left bar in each column of Fig. 8 shows the
unique transactions added to the orphan pools with varying
sizes. The right bar of the respective column shows the total
transactions added to the orphan pools with varying sizes.
All values are normalized to the average number of unique
transactions added to the orphan pools with a default size
of 100 over the measurement period which, on average, is
5.72× 104 transactions.
We observe yet another trend: for smaller orphan pool
sizes, identical transactions may be added several times to the
orphan pool. This is likely because smaller orphan pool fill
more quickly as the number of incoming orphan transactions
grows. As such, transactions need to be removed more often
from the orphan pool whilst they are still orphan - a peer
may re-announce a transaction that was previously removed
from the orphan pool. Because the node does not have the
transaction in either its mempool or the orphan pool, it accepts
the transaction again to its orphan pool.
When the size of the orphan pool is larger than the default
size of 100, the number of duplicate additions of transactions
to the orphan pool goes down. This is likely due to the
availability of space in the orphan pool for new orphan
transactions; fewer transactions need to be evicted from the
orphan pool. In the next section, we explain why multiple
additions may pose a problem for network efficiency.
D. Network overhead
We next estimate the network overhead (i.e., the number of
bytes received) caused by receiving duplicate orphan trans-
actions from peers. In our experiments, each time an orphan
transaction is received, we add the size of the transaction: 32
bytes for the transaction hash in the inv message [32] and 32
bytes for the transaction hash in the getdata message [33].
Note that this provides a lower bound for the number of bytes
transmitted each time a transaction is received, as the inv
and getdata messages contain other fields, the total size of
which would depend on the number of transactions packed in
each message. We do not include this size in our calculation
for simplicity. Similarly, we do not include the transport layer
overhead in our estimation.
Nodes
Round 1 Round 2
Add
(%)
Remove
(%)
Add
(%)
Remove
(%)
N1 18.23 17.26 18.71 16.90
N2 15.26 13.53 15.86 13.36
N3 18.67 18.61 18.37 17.36
N4 16.37 13.86 15.95 13.33
N5 18.22 17.90 18.67 17.58
N6 15.85 13.31 16.84 13.94
TABLE I: Average CPU usage of nodes with different orphan
pool sizes.
Fig. 9 shows statistics on the network overhead for duplicate
orphan transactions received for the varying orphan pool sizes.
The lower part of the stacked bar in each column shows the
total number of bytes that are received when all unique orphan
transactions are received for the first time. The upper part of
the stacked bar in the respective column shows total number of
bytes received when duplicates of the orphan transactions are
received; note that the Y -axis in this figure is logarithmic. We
also provide the cost of receiving duplicate orphan transactions
(above each bar) as a fraction of the cost of receiving each
orphan transaction for the respective orphan pool size.
From the figures, we see that nodes with a smaller orphan
pool size incur a larger network overhead due to the repeated
addition of orphan transactions to the orphan pool. On the
contrary, nodes with an orphan pool of larger size incur
minimal network overhead, since the number of duplicate
orphan transactions received is smaller (cf. subsection IV-C).
E. Performance overhead
Finally, we explore the CPU and memory overhead incurred
by varying orphan pool sizes. We empirically measure the
CPU overhead with data from Unix procfs, and approximate
the memory overhead. Our analysis shows that larger orphan
pool sizes do not incur significant overhead for our node
systems.
1) CPU overhead: The CPU overhead is observed by
recording the CPU usage of the Bitcoin process every time
an orphan transaction is added or removed from the orphan
pool. TABLE I shows the average CPU usage of the Bitcoin
process over the measurement period. The table shows that the
difference in the average CPU usage of the Bitcoin process is
barely distinguishable among the various orphan pool sizes.
We attribute this to the data structure used for the orphan
pool: relevant std::map operations typically have worst-case
logarithmic time complexity [34]–[36].
2) Memory overhead: The Bitcoin core maintains three
data structures related to orphan transactions. The first data
structure represents the orphan pool. Each entry for an orphan
transaction in the orphan pool contains i) the hash of the
transaction (32 bytes), ii) a pointer to the actual transaction
(16-byte integer on 64-bit architecture; 8-byte integer on 32-
bit architecture; the size of this pointer is double that of an
ordinary pointer because a std::shared_ptr is made of
2 pointers [37], iii) the ID of the peer that sent the transaction
(8-byte integer), iv) expiration time of the transaction (8-byte
integer), and v) position of orphan transaction in the orphan
pool (8-byte integer on 64-bit architecture; 4-byte on 32-bit
architecture). Considering that the transaction would be stored
in the mempool anyway if it were not am orphan, each orphan
transaction incurs a memory overhead of 72 bytes on a 64-bit
architecture, and 60 bytes on a 32-bit architecture.
The second data structure is used to maintain links between
a missing parent and all orphan transactions that may spend
from it. This efficiently resolves orphan status of all orphan
transactions that depend on a missing parent once the latter is
received from peers.
Each entry in this data structure contains i) the hash of the
parent (32 bytes), ii) the index of the parent in the orphan
transaction (4 bytes), and iii) a pointer to the orphan transac-
tion in the orphan pool (8-byte integer on 64-bit architecture;
4-byte integer on 32-bit architecture). That is, each entry in
this data structure takes up 36 + 8 × N bytes on a 64-bit
architecture, and 36 + 4 × N bytes on a 32-bit architecture,
where N is the number of all orphan transactions that spend
from a missing parent.
It is tricky to theoretically justify a hard bound on the
overhead incurred by this data structure. A transaction may
spend from an arbitrary number of parents, an unknown
number of which may be missing. Furthermore, not all parents
may be missing at the same time, i.e., a peer may not respond
with all requested missing parents at the same time. On the
other hand, an arbitrary number of orphan transactions may
spend from the same missing parent.
Our empirical data, however, suggests that, orphan trans-
actions across nodes with the varying orphan pool sizes
have, on average, between 1 and 4 missing parents, where
transactions across nodes with smaller pool sizes miss more
parents. Transactions across nodes with larger orphan pool
sizes miss more than 1 parents with a very low probability.
On average, more than 90% of orphan transactions received
by nodes configured with an orphan pool of size 1000 miss
only 1 parent.
Similarly, across nodes with varying orphan pool sizes, the
number of missing parents that orphan transactions share is in
the range (0, 1) on average. For every node, more than 98% of
all orphan transactions received by that node share no parent.
Finally, for efficient random eviction of transactions from
the orphan pool when the pool is full, a list is maintained.
Each entry in the list is a pointer to a transaction in the orphan
pool, with an overhead of 8-bytes for a 64-bit architecture and
4-bytes for a 32-bit architecture.
Consider, for example, a node configured with an orphan
pool of size 1000 on a 64-bit architecture. This configuration
incurs a memory overhead of roughly 72 kilobytes for the
first data structure, 44 kilobytes, on average, for the second
data structure, and 8 kilobytes for the third data structure
for an aggregated overhead of 122 kilobytes on average.
This overhead is not significant on most modern day systems
which are usually configured with memory several orders of
magnitude larger.
V. CONCLUSION
We have investigated some of the circumstances under
which a Bitcoin transaction is orphaned. Our data shows that
orphan transactions have, on average, fewer parents than other
transactions. The parents that cause transactions to become
orphaned also have a lower transaction fee and a larger
size relative to all received transactions. On an individual
level, the missing parents also have, on average, a lower
transaction fee per byte as compared to parents of all received
transactions. This information can be utilized by Bitcoin users
to appropriate set their own transaction fees and facilitate
propagation through the network.
We have also documented the network and performance
overhead incurred by orphan transactions for orphan pools of
varying sizes. Our analysis reveals that as the orphan pool
size grows, more transactions are removed from the pool, not
because the pool is full but because the transactions time out.
This in turn reduces the duplicate addition of transactions to
the orphan pool, which results in a much smaller network
overhead. Our evaluations show that the performance overhead
incurred by a larger orphan pool is non-significant, and it is
thus advisable to set an orphan pool of larger size to reduce
network overhead.
We note, in closing, that our nodes in this work are
continuously connected to the Bitcoin network throughout the
measurement periods. However, prior work [29] shows that
many Bitcoin nodes exhibit churn, meaning that they often
lose connectivity. It would be interesting to evaluate the effect
of such churn on the behavior of orphan transactions.
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